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Abstract: Investigating the competition-stability view in relation to the banking sector, the intention behind 
this study was to find out how far efficiency is associated with a competitive banking environment and if it 
warrants the continued agitation towards fostering increased competition in banking markets around the 
world. This view has significant support in spite of the potential instability that could possibly result from 
risk appetite, which the competition-fragility view holds to be associated with competition. We employed a 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to model an instrumental variable of competition resulting from increased 
efficiency or inefficiency due to bank-level competition, which we used in the regression of competition 
against stability using the generalized method of moments (GMM). We found that competition increased the 
efficiency of the banking sector over the study period. The regression results of our instrument against 
stability in the Sub-Saharan Africa region was found to be positive and strongly significant with stability 
providing evidence of transmission from competition to efficiency to stability, and, hence consistent with 
competition-stability views. Our conclusion is that while competition is desirable, it must be optimized to 
enhance efficiency without which the effects become detrimental. Therefore, there must be ongoing 
regulation to check excessive competition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Competition and stability in banks are important issues to bankers and regulators alike especially in the wake 
of the 2007/2009 financial crisis. Bank competition has become even more of concern as policy makers in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region rethink their strategies to break the yoke of poverty and transform their 
economies to those of their developed counterparts. Policy expectation is that a competitive banking 
environment will promote efficiency, increase overall competitiveness in other sectors of an economy, and 
thus promote economic growth. However, the competition-stability trade-off means that caution must be 
applied in order not to sacrifice financial system stability in the bid to engender competition to stimulate 
economic growth. In this study, the role of competition in the financial stability of the SSA region is examined 
by evaluating a panel data analysis of 37 SSA countries’ commercial banks’ data. Over the years, the findings 
of both theoretical and empirical papers on the relationship between competition and stability have been 
mixed, indefinite and inconclusive. Yet, a new look at the role of bank competition in bringing about the 
dynamic efficiency of the banking system and other sectors without compromising financial stability is now 
essential if the SSA region is to harness the gains of competition without compromising financial system 
stability. 
 
There is an ongoing debate on the effect of competition on stability. Two strands of literature exist, one for 
and one against the competition-stability view (Agoraki, Delis & Pasiouras, 2011; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014). 
Specifically in Africa, there have been two conflicting views. Moyo, Nandwa, Council, Oduor, and Simpasa 
(2014) found evidence to support competition-stability views while Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014) posit 
otherwise. According to Casu, Girardone, and Molyneux (2012), these  inconsistent results regarding the 
relationship between competition and stability make interpretation and policy measures very difficult given 
the economic implications of banking system failure. These authors failed to account for the role of efficiency 
in the competition and stability relationship, which was identified by Léon (2015) as a gap in the literature 
especially in Africa.  Hence, there is the need for further research to substantiate these views by including the 
possible transmission channels of competition through efficiency to stability. Therefore, the compelling 
question is, “does competition cause the stability of banks in the SSA region commercial banks?” This 
question becomes germane because the SSA region seeks a competitive banking sector in order to stimulate 
economic growth in the region(Watkins, 2014). 
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This paper aligns with a long history of literature dealing with banking competition and, specifically, the 
concerns as to through what channel of transmission competition impacts on the stability of the system. Our 
contribution involves the use of a unique method, using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), to exogenously 
model an instrumental variable for competition in a regression with stability, and hence fill the gap relating to 
the transmission mechanism between competition and stability as well as the measurement of how much 
efficiency is associated with competition. Furthermore, our study provides an extension of the study by Moyo 
et al. (2014)1to include quite a sizeable number of SSA countries for possible generalization. Our results 
indicate that the Lerner index is negatively related to stability. However, our instrument of competition 
provides evidence to support the competition-stability view as held by (Moyo et al., 2014)given that the 
results of the SFA reveal an increase in efficiency in the competition-efficiency relationship.  Therefore, we 
establish a possible transmission from competition to stability through efficiency in the banking sector of the 
SSA region, implying that banking competition is not bad after all, but has to be optimized. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature that deals with competition, efficiency and 
stability relationships. Section 3 presents our methodology, and in section 4 we present the empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The place of competition in banking has been a subject of intense controversy among practitioners and 
academics alike. According to Casu (2015), a healthy degree of rivalry is considered necessary for the 
efficiency of the banking industry and for the stability of the system as a whole. The contestable market 
theory posits that with free entry and costless exit, market structure will not matter as potential competition 
guarantees efficient production and pricing regardless of existing players in the market. This, according to 
Dietsch (1993), brings the market to stability and equilibrium irrespective of the existing market structure. 
Works that have investigated the nexus between competition and stability have alluded to the presence of 
efficiency as imperative in any study of the competition and stability relationship (Bolt & Humphrey, 2010; 
Castellanos, Del Ángel & Garza-García, 2016; Genetay, Lin, Molyneux, & Fu, 2015; Hussain & Hassan, 2012; 
Schaeck & Cihák, 2014). Whether competition results in efficiency, however, is the major preoccupation of the 
structure conduct performance (SCP) hypothesis? Proponents of this model argue that collusion is anti-
competition and causes abnormal profit. Existing literature on this model in Africa tends to find consistency 
with it (see(Chirwa, 2003; Mugume, 2007), but suffers from the setback of using concentration as a measure 
of competition. Attempts to overcome the setback of the structural model gave rise to the Lerner index and 
the Panzar-RosseH-statistics among other non-structural models of measuring competition. In spite of their 
own various shortcomings, such models offer better competition measures (Muneer et al., 2011; Liu, 
Molyneux, & Wilson, 2013). 
 
A simple measure of a firm’s efficiency is defined by Farrell (1957)who argues that technical efficiency 
reflects a firm’s ability to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs. Farrell explains his idea by 
assuming that firms use two inputs (𝑋1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋2) to produce one output (y), and production is under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale. In other words, an increase (decrease) in the inputs leads to the same 
proportional increase (decrease) of the output. Overtime, the parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
introduced by Farrell (1957) has been used to test this theory empirically. It is important to note that most 
studies that have considered output-related technical efficiency measures have mainly used pretax income 
(PTI), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE), and have concluded that a statistically significant 
positive relationship exists between competition and efficiency. Banking stability is often measured by 
systemic banking stress, which is defined as periods when the banking system is unable to fulfill its 
obligations as they fall due, which the works of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997)and Valencia and 
Laeven (2012) describe as an occurrence of banking crisis. Rather than focusing on systematic banking stress, 
lots of banking research articles employ bank-level data to compute banking distress. The most popular 
among these is the Z-score, which sums up the capital-asset ratio and return on assets, weighted by the 
standard deviation on return on assets (Roy, 1952). Other researchers have also captured the risk of defaults 
related to the banking loan portfolio using the non-performing loan (NPLs) ratio (Amidu, 2013). 
 
                                                          
1They considered 16 SSA countries. 
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Subsisting empirical models in banking literature, specifically relating to competition-stability and 
competition-fragility views, reveal that competition could be good or bad for the banking industry as it may 
result in either stability or fragility. According to the stability view, efficiency comes with competition, which 
results in systemic stability (Boyd, De Nicoló, & Jalal, 2009; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014; Uhde & Heimeshoff, 
2009). The rationale is that competition can have a stabilizing effect on a banking system as efficiency is 
improved and loan interest rates are lowered, thereby reducing the likelihood of borrower defaults. However, 
the fragility view holds that competition is associated with moral hazard, adverse selection and agency 
problems as managers strive to cope with a competitive environment resulting in instability (Agoraki et al., 
2011; Ariss, 2010; Beck, De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013; Fu, Lin, & Molyneux, 2014; Yeyati & Micco, 2007). In 
line with this view, the explanation is that banks under high competitive pressure choose more excessive risk, 
thus increasing fragility, which may result in individual bank failure. This means that moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems are associated with excessive competition in banks where the wrong client is 
attracted, which in turn pushes up loan rates to the detriment of low-risk customers. Meanwhile, Berger, 
Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) and Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro (2012) found a rather non-linear relationship 
between competition and stability. As a matter of fact, only one paper has investigated the competition-
stability nexus in Africa, thereby providing support for the competition-stability view (Khan et al., 2013; 
Moyo et al., 2014). In their study of the banking sectors in 16 SSA countries, they found that countries with a 
higher level of H-statistics, that is, more competitive banking systems, have banks that are more stable. It is 
imperative that further research is done to revalidate this result and perhaps explore the channels through 
which competition affects stability in the SSA region and elsewhere. These aspects are among the focus of this 
study. 
 
Theoretically, banking competition should result in efficiency, hence, the stability of the banking system. 
However, empirical models and evidence reveal that competition results in both stability and instability. But 
these models and evidence fail to consider the mediating role of efficiency in the study of the relationship 
between competition and stability, which probably is the flash point of the endogeneity between them. This 
study, therefore, fills the gap in the literature on this subject matter by applying stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) to investigate the role of efficiency in the competition-stability relationship. The study also sheds light 
on how much efficiency is orchestrated that warrants the need for competition, which the competition 
fragility view argues increases the risk appetite of banks. Hence, the endogeneity issues between competition 
and stability can also be addressed with the exogenous instrument of competition, which is created to be used 
in a regression of competition on stability (Suwandi et al., 2016). 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The main objective of this work is to investigate the effects of competition on stability among SSA commercial 
banks. The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach is employed to generate an instrumental variable of 
competition to be regressed on bank stability for the period 2006 to 2015. Previous studies on the 
competition and stability view found competition-stability, competition-fragility and a U-shaped relationship 
(Fu et al., 2014; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014; Tabak et al., 2012). It has also been established that efficiency is 
pivotal in the competition and stability relationship (Ariss, 2010; Chirwa, 2003; Mugume, 2007). Yet, as far as 
we know, no existing studies have explicitly attempted to explore factoring in efficiency in studying the 
relationship between competition and stability. How is competition related to banks’ overall stability? Does 
competition help to improve or lower banks’ efficiency? Answers to these questions will help to establish the 
role of competition in stability management in banks. Extant literature, however, confronts an inherent 
problem in regressing competition against stability in order to measure the effects of competition on stability 
because of the obvious endogeneity problem. Hence, this study follows Chiou and Porter (2015) to develop an 
exogenous instrument of competition in a regression with stability using the unique SFA. 
 
Concerning the techniques, two methods are used in the literature, these being: the parametric-like SFA 
(Hughes, Mester, & Moon, 2001; Hughes, 2013; Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, & Pagano, 2003; Nguyen, 
2010)and non-parametric methods such as data envelopment analysis (DEA) (Bauer, Berger, Ferrier, & 
Humphrey, 1998; Berger & Hannan, 1998; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014) among others. SFA is an economic 
modeling method that was introduced by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982) following the 
stochastic production frontier previously introduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and Van 
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den Broeck (1977) and Farrell (1957). This study adopts the SFA approach because among the modern and 
most popular frontier analysis techniques, SFA allows the construction of a unique instrumental variable of 
competition that is exogenous to banks’ stability. This approach helps to deal with the endogeneity between 
competition and stability by using SFA to estimate the inefficiency in our sample of SSA banking sectors. 
Furthermore, the SFA fits best in analyzing firms’ efficiency as it accounts for statistical noise (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005; Kao & Liu, 2009). The argument is that empirical efficiencies calculated from 
anon-parametric technique such as DEA provide low consistent estimators of the true inefficiencies. 
 
Model Specification: We follow Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014) to estimate bank-level competition of the SSA 
region commercial banks based on the Lerner index, while the instrument of competition is a developed 
competition-efficiency hypothesis following Chiou and Porter (2015). The models are discussed going 
forward. 
 
Lerner Index: Given that the optimal output, 𝑄𝑇𝑌𝑖 , of banks 𝑖, where 𝑖 =  1;  𝑁 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡, is at the point 
where marginal cost, 𝑀𝐶𝑖 , equals its marginal revenue, 𝑀𝑅𝑖 , the proportion of the difference between the 
price, Pi, and the marginal cost, 𝑀𝐶𝑖 , on price is the Lerner index denoted as 𝐿𝐼𝑖  and expressed algebraically as 
shown in 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐴. 1), see (Flamini, Schumacher, & McDonald, 2009). 
𝐿𝐼𝑖 =
𝑃𝑖− 𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑃𝑖
         (1)    
Where 𝑃𝑖  is the estimate of average price of bank production in country 𝑖, which is proxied by the ratio of 
bank total revenue to total assets (Berg & Kim, 1994; Berger et al., 2009; Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos, & 
Molyneux, 2009; Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos, & Perez, 2005; Shaffer, 2004). To estimate𝑀𝐶𝑖 , the first 
derivative of translog cost function2 with respect to 𝑄𝑇𝑌𝑖  is computed. We modelled the translog cost function 
from the generalised translog production function3through the second-order Taylor series expansion of 
banks cost in natural logarithm. Relying on the intermediation approach for measuring bank output (Ajisafe & 
Akinlo, 2013; Sealey & Lindley, 1977),the total cost of banks consists of one output,𝑄𝑇𝑌, and three 
inputs,𝑊1,𝑊2, and 𝑊3, representing price of labour (ratio of personnel expense to total assets), price of 
physical capital (non-interest expense to fixed assets), and price of fund (interest expense to total deposits), 
respectively. Hence, we arrived at the reduced translog cost function in panel form in 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (2) below;  
 
ln⁡(Cit ) = β0 + β1ln⁡(QTYit ) +
1
2
β
2
ln⁡(QTYit  
2 ) +  θk ln Wkit  +                             ∮kln⁡(QTYit  )ln(Wkit ) +
3
k=1
3
k=1
12k=13j=13∅kjln(Wkit )ln(Wjit)+μit (2) 
 
where 𝑄𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 is bank output measured as the natural log of total assets of bank 𝑖 in time 𝑡(de Guevara & 
Maudos, 2011),𝑊𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the vector of the three input prices andμ𝑖𝑡 is the error term.Taking the first derivative of 
the translog cost function with respect to output the marginal cost is given as: 
 
 MCit =  
δC it
δQTY it
=
1
QTY it
 β
1
+ β
2
In(QTYit  ) +  ∮k
3
k=1 In(Wkit )  (3) 
 
Substituting 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3) for marginal cost in 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (1), the degree of competition will be computed 
using: 
LI =
Pit −
1
QTY it
 (β1+β2In (QTY it )+ ∮k
3
k =1 In (Wkit ))
Pit
             (4) 
 
Instrumental Variable of Competition: To construct the instrumental variable of competition, this study 
follows Chiou and Porter (2015). The inefficiency of the banks is defined by the distance between the specific 
bank’s pretax income and the frontier. Expressing the frontier according to a specific production model, in 
                                                          
2Another way to estimate cost function is the average variable cost expressed as the ratio of total variable cost to total 
asset or total income. Although this seems a simpler and straightforward approach, it has been argued to be inaccurate. 
3Some other common production functional forms include linear, Cobb-Douglas, quadratic, normalised quadratic, 
constant elasticity of substitution and generalised Leontief functions. 
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this case, it is assumed that a bank’s profitability can be specified as the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 𝐼𝑛(𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 ) =  𝛼 +   𝑏ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=1 𝐼𝑛(𝑋𝑖𝑡 ,ℎ) +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡  (5) 
Where,𝑣𝑖𝑡  represents the noise component, considered as a two-sided normally distributed variable and 𝑢𝑖  
equals the non-negative technical inefficiency component. Because 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑢𝑖  constitute a compound error 
term with a specific distribution to be determined, SFA is therefore often referred to as the composed error 
model. 
 
The SFA in 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (5) is employed to create a unique instrumental variable of bank competition to be used 
in the regression of competition and stability in the SSA region commercial banks. This should provide 
answers to the question of, how efficient is a bank in converting the resources with which it has to work into 
profit in the face of competition? Hence, we develop an unrestricted frontier that determines the highest 
possible profitability based solely on the employed banks’ assets book value. This is specified as: 
 𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  𝐴𝐵𝑉 =  𝛼 +  𝑏1𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2(𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 )
2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (6) 
 
Where 𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  equals pre-tax income, 𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡  is assets book value, 𝑒𝑖𝑡  =  ∮𝑖𝑡  −  𝜆𝑖𝑡 , the composite error, 
∮  ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁 (0, 𝛿∮
2 ), is the stochastic noise, which is a two sided error term, 𝜆 ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁  0, 𝛿𝜆
2 , the systematic fall 
(technical inefficiency) a one-sided error and 0… . The quadratic equation allows for a non-linear relation 
between the pre-tax income and the book value of asset. The essence is to allow technical efficiency to vary 
through time, and across the cross-section of banks (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2003). 
 
The efficiency scores are estimated using Frontier version 4.1 (Coelli, 1996), a computer programme based 
on stochastic production functions (Battese & Coelli, 1992; Battese & Coelli, 1995)written to provide 
maximum likelihood estimates of different types of stochastic frontier production as independently 
introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). It accounts for a truncated 
normal assumption including panel data with time varying efficiencies, and is hence applicable to our 
unbalanced panel model, with firm effects having truncated normal random variables distribution 
assumptions that are allowed to vary systematically with time (Battese & Coelli, 1992). Next, we develop the 
second frontier based on the level of banking sector competition. The essence of the unrestricted model is to 
measure the unconditional inefficiencies of the banks. By restricting the model now, will enable us to develop 
a measure of incremental efficiency or inefficiency of a banking organisation due to the level of competition 
within the banking industry. It is this incremental efficiency/inefficiency arising from bank-level competition 
that the study proposes to use as an instrument for competition in the regression of bank stability on 
competition. 
The restricted model again, in a quadratic form, is as follows: 
 
 𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  𝐴𝐵𝑉, 𝐵𝐶𝐿 = 𝛼 + 𝑏1𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2(𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 )
2 + 𝑏3𝐵𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (7) 
  
Where BLC is bank level competition, 𝜀𝑖𝑡  =  𝑣𝑖𝑡  –  𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the composite error, such that,𝑣 ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁 (0, 𝛿𝑣
2), is 
stochastic noise and 𝑢 (⩾ 0) ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁 (0, 𝛿𝑢
2) is the inefficiency orchestrated by the level of competition that the 
banking sector has to cope with. The estimation of 𝑢 is the same as in 𝑒𝑞𝑛 (7) above. Based on the two 
inefficiencies assessments, the profitability due to the influence of competition can then be measured by 
subtracting the inefficiency of the unrestricted model from the restricted model thus: 
 ϑ𝑖𝑡  =  𝑢𝑖𝑡  –  𝜆𝑖𝑡     (8) 
This, therefore, constitutes the instrumental variable for competition. 
 
From the forgoing, the relationship between the variable specifying banks’ stability and competition is 
analyzed by the regression equation specified as follows: 
 𝑌𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏𝑘𝑖𝑡 ϑ𝑘𝑖𝑡 + φ𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑛 𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑘𝑖𝑡  + η𝑘𝑖𝑡         (9) 
Where 𝑌𝑘𝑖𝑡 measures the stability for bank 𝑖 in country 𝑘 at year 𝑡. 𝐶𝑘𝑖𝑡  is a constant; 𝑏𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the coefficient of 
instrumental variable of competition, ϑ𝑘𝑖𝑡 , for 𝑘’𝑠 regression in year 𝑡;φ𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the coefficient of the natural 
logarithm of bank asset book value; andη
𝑘𝑖𝑡
is the error term. The book value of asset helps to control for the 
impact of size on banks’ risk-taking behavior (Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan, 2009) 
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The SSA banking sector’s stability is, for the purpose of this study, defined as the Z-score. The Z-score, 
according to Roy (1952), is used to measure the overall stability of a bank and has been used in the bank 
literature (see (Čihák, 2012; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014; Laeven & Levine, 2009; Lepetit & Strobel, 2013). It is 
an indicator of banks’ probability of insolvency as it estimates the number of standard deviations that a 
bank’s profit has to fall below its expected value before its equity becomes negative. We implement the 
regression using the generalized method of moments (GMM) regression.  The ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method could not be used because of the departure from normality of the variable ϑ due to the combined 
error terms. Unlike other estimators, GMM is robust and does not require information on the exact 
distribution of the disturbances. The GMM estimator is known to be consistent, asymptotically normal and 
efficient in the class of all estimators that do not use any extra information apart from that contained in the 
moment conditions (Abdelkader & Mansouri, 2013; Arellano & Bond, 1991; Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & Delis, 
2008; Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997; Gatev et al., 2009; Hamilton, 1994; Roodman, 2006). It is also 
efficient for a large number of observations over the relatively short term. In addition, GMM deals with 
endogeneity in a better way than other methods.  
 
Data: We obtained our data on banks for this study from the Bankscope database by Fitch/IBCA Bureau van 
Dijk for37 SSA countries’ commercial banks’ financial profiles for the years 2006 to 2015. A total of 440 
banks’ data ranging from 190 banks in 2006 to 440 banks in 2015 were consulted. The selection is based on 
the availability of data from the database. SSA countries’ selections exclude those we considered as outliers4. 
Bankscope is considered as the most comprehensive database for banking research. Specific data collected 
relate to total revenue, total assets, interest and non-interest expense, personnel expense, total asset, and 
total deposits required for the estimation of bank-level competition as contained in the literature (see (Berger 
et al., 2009; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014) among others). This study considered Roy (1952) proposition of the Z-
score as a proxy for the overall stability of the banking sector. It provides a measure of the distance from 
insolvency of a given bank by combining a bank’s profitability, capitalization and volatility of returns. It also 
estimates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s profits have to fall below before its expected equity 
becomes negative and, hence, is a holistic measure of the end results of whatever risk a bank may undertake. 
The Z-score has been used in measuring banking sector stability in the literature (see (Čihák, 2012; Kouki & 
Al-Nasser, 2014; Laeven & Levine, 2009; Lepetit & Strobel, 2013). Both return on asset and equity capital 
ratio, which are required for the computation of the Z-score, are collected as part of the annualized data 
obtained from Bankscope. Other specific data collected include annual data on pre-tax income (Chiou & 
Porter, 2015) and asset book value (Barro & Barro, 1990) employed for the input and output variables for the 
output-oriented stochastic frontier analysis.  
 
4. Results 
 
This section sets out the results of our estimations. Based on the questions we posed to actualize the objective 
of this study, we tested for these three hypotheses related to our expectation of the relationship between 
competition and stability in the SSA region: 1. There is no significant relationship between competition and 
efficiency; 2. There is no significant relationship between competition and stability; 3. There is no link 
between competition and stability that results from efficiency. Our assertions are borne out by the level of 
development of the commercial banks in the SSA region. 
 
Summary of Statistics: The numbers for banks and statistics for the competition measure, and the Lerner 
index, over the sample years are reported in Table 1. The means of other descriptive statistics are listed: Z-
score, the stability measure; ABV, asset book value; ROA, return on asset; ROE, return on equity and PBT, 
profit before tax. The Lerner index produced a range of competition measures with varying degrees of market 
power.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 South Africa, having a highly developed and sophisticated banking system, while others, such as Sudan ravaged by wars, 
were excluded for data availability and consistency. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
  
Lerner 
Index 
  
year N mean SD min max zscore abv roa roe pbt 
2006 190 0.256 0.166 0.001 0.837 3.543 371505 0.020 0.191 10402 
2007 215 0.269 0.156 0.013 0.784 3.205 529336 0.018 0.196 12804 
2008 250 0.288 0.177 0.011 0.967 3.380 582588 0.020 0.180 18339 
2009 275 0.294 0.188 0.010 0.921 3.295 691492 0.014 0.148 14049 
2010 296 0.296 0.183 0.000 0.979 3.274 695667 0.010 0.132 18975 
2011 320 0.282 0.173 0.003 0.977 2.989 970764 0.012 0.123 20293 
2012 357 0.324 0.194 0.005 0.998 3.235 1060910 0.013 0.116 26529 
2013 392 0.352 0.314 0.000 0.988 3.404 1153087 0.012 0.087 27427 
2014 430 0.332 0.185 0.000 0.996 3.624 1159650 0.011 0.076 27435 
2015 440 0.324 0.196 0.001 0.996 3.484 1111977 0.011 0.069 23320 
Authors’ computation, 2017 
 
As seen in the table, while some banks have indices that are near zero, other indices are close to 1, given the 
minimum and the maximum columns. This distribution is expected based on the pockets of concentrations 
that were reported in some banking literature for the SSA region. However, the closeness of the mean of the 
Lerner index to the minimum values implies a relatively competitive banking market, which could be 
described as being monopolistic competition in nature. The mean of the Z-score shows indices that are 
greater than 1. The higher the Z-score, the better, as a higher Z-score depicts a stable banking system. While 
the return on assets seems to be quite low in contrast to those of the return on equity, overall, the mean 
values provide evidence of a banking system that is performing over the periods under investigation, which 
corroborates the stability reflected by the z-score. This sketchy behavior shown by the summary statistics 
tends to point to a model of competition, efficiency and stability, which this study hopes to reveal in 
subsequent sections of the paper. 
 
Instrumental Variable: Instrumental variable for competition descriptive statistics over the years sampled 
are displayed. The instrumental variable ϑ𝑖𝑡  =  𝑢𝑖𝑡  –  𝜆𝑖𝑡  is a measure of incremental bank 
inefficiency/efficiency due to bank level competition and/or degree of market power, where the stochastic 
frontiers are 𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  𝐴𝐵𝑉 =  𝛼 + 𝑏1𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2(𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 )
2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  and 𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  𝐴𝐵𝑉, 𝐵𝐶𝐿 = 𝛼 + 𝑏1𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
 𝑏2(𝐴𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 )
2 +  𝑏3𝐵𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 .The first frontier measured the level of banks’ inefficiencies in converting their 
resources to output (profit). This determines the maximum possible income achievable from a given level of 
asset, which is exogenous to a specific bank because it is determined from the data of all banks in the sample. 
The distance from this frontier to any specific bank’s actual income is a measure of a bank’s inefficiency.  With 
the second frontier, the instrument of competition is created conditioned to bank-level competition given its 
production capacity. The incremental inefficiency/efficiency from the second frontier is a function of bank 
competition; in other words, the difference between the second and the first frontier’s efficiency scores is 
used as the instrument for competition (see Table 2 for the description of our instrumental variable).   
 
Table 2: Instrumental Variable Distribution 
year mean SD kurtosis skewness min max 
2006 -4.08368E-06 7.04307E-05 66.46838888 7.558965536 -6.73E-05 0.00067622 
2007 5.52651E-07 0.000163903 167.7121601 12.41309188 -0.00015733 0.00224774 
2008 -1.35568E-05 4.3518E-05 31.93930828 4.276213275 -0.00011717 0.00036802 
2009 -4.68567E-06 0.000117389 127.1648157 10.31878458 -0.0001322 0.00157034 
2010 2.18235E-05 0.000305294 119.5363149 10.46394279 -0.00013972 0.00395189 
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2011 -1.00525E-06 0.000216933 272.8637947 15.94867855 -0.00015109 0.0037175 
2012 2.69355E-05 0.000644388 343.9703535 18.38833656 -0.00014222 0.01205672 
2013 -9.40666E-06 9.1474E-05 56.41178163 5.86973908 -0.00035134 0.0010471 
2014 -3.38535E-06 0.000123564 62.19802236 7.017162991 -0.00015697 0.00133269 
2015 -1.14878E-05 8.35993E-05 46.01088163 5.639606657 -0.0001813 0.0008062 
Authors’ estimation, 2017 
 
Based on pairwise correlation, the instrument is strongly negatively correlated with the Lerner index and the 
variable it replaces at 0.7732 with 0.0000 p-value, and uncorrelated with the residual at -0.0000 with 1.0000 
p-value, affirming that it is a good instrument. We found a marginal efficiency from the results of the SFA, that 
is, the efficiency scores are closer to the frontier with bank-level competition as against the absence of 
competition. This provides evidence to support a positive relationship between competition and efficiency. 
We also found consistency with Castellanos et al. (2016), Çeli̇k, Kaplan, and Şahi̇n (2015) and Casu and 
Girardone (2009)who argued that banks in a competitive system become more efficient, substantiating the 
quiet life hypothesis. However, a recent account by Apriadi, Sembel, Santosa, and Firdaus (2016) posits that 
competition negatively Granger causes efficiency. For our sample, the distribution of ϑ in the same year tends 
to be skewed to the right-hand side and has positive excess kurtosis. On this note, we consider a 
nonparametric and use a normality-free regression model for our analysis to avoid the possible errors of 
estimation. 
 
GMM Results: The results of our generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations from models 1 - 5 are 
shown in Table 4. To enhance robustness, we present in Table 3 both pairwise correlation coefficients 
between the tested variables, the instrumental variable for competition, ϑ, and the Lerner index. We did not 
test for the presence of cross-sectional dependence in our panel estimation, as according to Chudik, Pesaran, 
and Tosetti (2011) and Chudik and Pesaran (2013), it is ideal to relax the cross-sectional dependence 
assumption in large cross-sections like ours. They argue that even where it exists, controlling for it is difficult 
and the result would not necessary be biased.  
 
Table 3: Correlation Results 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ϑ & z-score 0.1644 0.2468 -0.027 0.0341 0.2341 0.2791 0.2583 -0.0572 0.1089 0.0296 
p-value 0.0234 0.0003 0.6712 0.5737 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2584 0.0239 0.5363 
Lerner index  
& z-score 
-0.1346 -0.2072 -0.0259 -0.0098 -0.3066 -0.3131 -0.2533 0.0038 -0.0681 -0.0174 
p-value 0.064 0.0023 0.6834 0.8715 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9409 0.1586 0.7166 
Lerner 
index & 
pbtaratio 
0.0198 0.2863 0.0183 0.2339 0.0131 -0.0737 0.1276 -0.0045 -0.0204 -0.0387 
-v lue 0.7859 0.0000 0.7737 0.0001 0.8225 0.1886 0.0159 0.9297 0.6735 0.4184 
Lerner  
index &roa 
0.0338 0.2649 0.0771 0.3189 0.039 -0.0596 0.1213 0.0559 0.0715 0.0062 
p-value 0.6433 0.0001 0.2244 0.0000 0.5041 0.288 0.0219 0.2699 0.1389 0.8966 
Lerner index 
& roe 
-0.0005 0.0496 0.0788 0.1581 0.0224 0.0099 0.0358 0.0302 0.0072 -0.0118 
p-value 0.9943 0.4716 0.2184 0.0092 0.7027 0.8609 0.5002 0.5521 0.882 0.8057 
Author’s 
Estimation 2017 
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For efficient and robust estimates, this study uses the dynamic panel data estimation technique, and opted for 
the two-step system GMM with robust and orthogonal deviation to account for the unbalanced nature of the 
panel. To control for the size of the banks, the coefficient of ϑ and those of the Lerner index are generated by 
GMM regression with a constant and the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. The coefficients of the 
control variable and the constant term are reported in Table 4. 
 
A cursory look at the results in Table 4 and the stability measure in the models 1 and 2 exhibit a statistically 
significant and positive relationship with their lagged values, which implies that previous financial systems’ 
stability in the banking sector largely determine the current stability of the system as well as persistence in 
the relationship. Our variable of interest, ϑ, the instrument of competition, is shown in model 1. ϑ is the 
instrument of competition5, derived from the relationship between competition and efficiency using SFA. The 
essence of this instrument is, firstly, to create a variable that is exogenously related to stability in the 
regression of stability on competition and, secondly, a variable that can capture efficiency in competition. By 
this means we found a new way to capture the competition and stability relationship whose results have been 
inconsistent in the literature largely due to the endogeneity between the duo. We found the instrument to be 
statistically significant and positively related to the Z-score, the stability measure. This offers far-reaching 
implications for the literature on competition and stability. We found consistency with Petersen and Rajan 
(1995), Berger and Mester (1997) and Williams (2004), who argued that efficiency enhances the 
administration and management of banks’ assets portfolios that reduces nonperforming loans hence 
improving the stability of banks. It is, therefore, logical for a competitively efficient banking sector to be 
financially stable. This finding aligns with the studies of Schaeck and Cihák (2014)where it is argued that 
efficiency is the conduit pipe through which the effects of competition in the banking system influence 
stability. Thus, our results establish a transmission mechanism from competition to efficiency to stability in 
the banking sectors of the SSA region. We therefore infer a direct positive relationship between competition 
and stability in the SSA region in line with the competition-stability views of(Akins, Li, Ng, & Rusticus, 2016; 
Moyo et al., 2014; Schaeck, Cihak, & Simon, 2009; Soedarmono, Machrouh, & Tarazi, 2013) among others, and 
argue against the competition-fragility views of (Agoraki et al., 2011; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014; Maghyereh & 
Awartani, 2016), among others. 
 
Table 4: GMM Regression 
 Model Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable            z-score    z-score pbtaratio roa roe 
L.zscore 0.785*** 0.580***    
 (0.0582) (0.0875)    
Θ 287.4***     
 (-108.5)     
Lnabv 0.322* 0.195** 0.00168** -0.00316** 3.052*** 
 (0.187) (0.0803) (0.000751) (0.00139) (0.497) 
lerner index  -0.0345*** 0.000221*** -5.85e-05** 0.0806** 
  (0.0084) (0.0000647) (-0.0000254) (0.0386) 
L.pbtaratio   0.432***   
   (0.0337)   
L.roa    0.562***  
    (0.132)  
L.roe     0.146** 
     (0.0596) 
Constant -3.399 -1.326 -0.00838 0.0478*** -25.98*** 
 (2.455) (1.044) (0.01) (0.017) (6.331) 
AR (2) 0.080 0.100 0.771 0.685 0.295 
Hansen J stats 0.451 0.176 0.496 0.655 0.732 
Wald (chi2) 942.24 87.72 185.35 32.35 61.06 
                                                          
5A proxy for competition 
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Prob >chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,696 
Number of id 430 430 430 430 429 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Where ϑ represents the instrument and 
Lerner index in the competition measure, while pbtaratio, roa and roe depict profit before tax to asset book 
value ratio, return on assets and return on equity, respectively, these being surrogate efficiency measures. 
 
For robustness, the original variable, the Lerner index that is the competition measure is also found to be 
statistically significant but negatively related to the stability measure. It suggests an inverse relation between 
competition and stability where competition is not associated with efficiency. This may be the reasons why 
some models have found competition to be fragile for banking sectors in the literature in some parts of the 
world, and it provides evidence that if competition is not well managed so as to cause efficiency it may be 
detrimental to the system, as is argued in the competition-fragility view. We further tested the results of the 
SFA by using a range of efficiency measures as contained in models 3, 4 and 5 for consistencies and 
comparison. Model 3 measures the relationship between the Lerner index and pretax income to assets ratio 
(pbtaratio). Pretax income measures the intrinsic profitability of the sampled banks to enable comparability 
across borders because of differences in corporate taxes. Hence, pbtaratio is an indicator of how profitable a 
bank is relative to its total assets. It gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to 
generate earnings. The study found that the Lerner index is statistically significant and positively related with 
pbtaratio. That is, a 1% increase in the competition index will mean a 0.0221% increase in profitability. This 
finding confirms the SFA results and existing theories that posit a positive relationship between competition 
and efficiency. We have thought that the level of development of the SSA region banks will take its toll on the 
results, as existing models relate largely to developed countries. 
 
The results of the Lerner index and return on assets, however, give a statistically significant but inverse 
relationship. While roa and pbtaratio measure the same thing, we assume that the difference in the results of 
roa from those of pbtaratio, is largely due to the impact of tax that banks face, which differ across countries. 
The SSA region may have to consider tax harmonization, as every sacrifice to achieve sustainable economic 
growth will be worthwhile. Finally, Model 5 results show a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between the Lerner index and return on equity (roe). ROE measures a corporation's profitability by revealing 
how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested. These results are a 
further affirmation of a positive relationship between competition and efficiency in the SSA region 
commercial banks. In general, this study found the result of Model 1 to be consistent with the competition-
stability views model in the literature (Moyo et al., 2014; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014),where it is argued that 
competition brings about efficiency, which then leads to stability of the banking sector. Our results confirm 
this transmission as shown from the result of SFA that reported a marginal efficiency being associated with 
competition in the SSA region. The implication will mean that provided competition can be managed to such a 
level that it produces efficiency, it will continue to enhance stability. It is not surprising, however, that 
competition on its own is inversely related to the stability measure, which substantiates the fact that 
competition on its own will more likely be inimical to the banking system, unless it improves efficiency 
without which it adds no value to the system, but rather causes instability. 
 
The marginal efficiency found in the SFA result is also confirmed in the results of models 3 and 5, which are 
seen to be consistent with the literature on competition and efficiency (Chirwa, 2003; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 
2014; Mugume, 2007). Notwithstanding that, there seems to exist an inverse relationship between 
competition and return on asset, and on the average, we tend to find evidence to support the aforementioned 
assertion that competition does cause efficiency. The results of these models are further supported by the 
tests of overall significance through the Wald test (see Table 4). This test shows that the estimated results for 
the five models are statistically significant. Therefore, all the variables used as determinants are all desirable 
and would influence both stability and efficiencies of the banking sectors significantly. We also did not find 
any violation of serial correlation and over-identification of instruments as the results of the test show the 
respective thresholds were satisfied(see (Mileva, 2007; Roodman, 2006). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In the course of this paper, we have set out to investigate the relationship between competition and stability 
especially as it relates to the SSA banking sector. To achieve this, we leveraged the relationship between 
competition and efficiency as contained in the literature to craft a new way of rethinking this relationship by 
developing an instrument for competition using SFA. We then used this instrument in a regression of 
competition against stability. We used the Z-score as a surrogate for stability. The Z-score measures the 
overall stability of the banking system. Our competition measure is the Lerner index, which enables us to 
estimate the market power of the 440 banks in our sample over the study period. The result of our bank-level 
competition with the Lerner index suggests a monopolistically competitive SSA banking system. The 
efficiency scores generated from the SFA reveal an actual sense that efficiency increases with competition in 
the SSA banking system over the period under consideration. This provides consistency with literatures that 
argue that efficiency is inherent in competition; hence, we conclude that competition is good for the banking 
system as it engenders the dynamic efficiency of the system.  
 
Using GMM, we found the coefficient of our instrument to be strictly positive and statistically significant with 
our stability measure. This affirms a possible transmission from competition to efficiency and then to 
stability. Hence, this is consistent with the competition-stability view, which argues that competition brings 
about efficiency, which then causes stability.  We, therefore, conclude that competition causes stability in the 
SSA region banking sector. However, as a rider, efforts must be made to manage competition such that 
efficiency is ensured, because regressing the Lerner index against stability shows a negative and statistically 
significant relationship. Again, this is not surprising in that competition fragility has already been reported in 
the literature, thus, the key is managing competition for efficiency. Our contribution lies in accounting for the 
role of efficiency in the competition-stability relationship without which competition may be undesirable for 
the banking system. We also substantiated the subsisting competition-stability view study in Africa to safe the 
cost to policy making of conflicting views in crafting policies on competition and stability relationship. This 
result presupposes that driving and maintaining sustainable banking competition in the SSA region is 
fundamental and a welcome development. The challenge, however, lies in optimizing competition to achieve 
the desirable goal of ensuring the dynamic efficiency of the banking sector so that it engenders stability and, 
consequently, economic growth. Of utmost importance, will be the need to strengthen the various antitrust 
agencies and ensuring strict adherence to various banking regulations that address issues of competition and 
including monitoring and developing new ones where necessary. Efforts must also be made to come up with 
complementary monetary and fiscal policies to sustain and improve on current gains. Regulators and 
watchdogs must also be alive to their responsibilities.  
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